Polling shows Americans are ready to support independent populists running on economic platforms. But what they don’t want is anything associated with the Democratic Party’s brand.
Like I said, I get being fed up with compromise. I’m fed up too. But plurality voting sucks, so let’s do some math:
Hammer Party has 45% of the votes. Pepsi Party has 50%. 5% go to some other, minor parties.
Now suppose a Cool Water party appears, clearly better than Warm Pepsi. They start drawing voters, some from the Pepsi, some maybe from non-voters, but the Hammer Party adherents don’t relent. They make it to 10%, with the Pepsi Party now standing at, say, 45%. Hammer are down to 43% thanks to higher turnout. Other parties down to 2%.
Next election, more Pepsi compromise voters are encouraged to vote Water. Water is up to 25%! Hammer is at 38% now – we’re making progress! Except that the Pepsi party now has a maximum of 37%, if there are no non-voters. Hammer party now has the most votes. That’s called the spoiler effect.
Obviously, the Pepsi fraction might see that shift coming and try to avoid it. For that, they’d either have to pull some of the Hammer voters, or accede to the Water voters in hopes of retaining them. Do you think they’ll compromise with Water? And do you think the Water voters are willing to trust that compromise?
Unless you somehow manage to rapidly turn a party up to 50% or win a significant amount of voters from both camps, odds are you’re going to make things worse. Hopefully, they’ll get better after that, unless Hammer Party manages to rig the system in their favour or even get rid of it. Is that a risk worth taking?
For a different example, suppose Water and Pepsi teamed up. Let’s take the initial 5% other voters, manage to push Hammer down to 31% and put the Pepsi party at a solid 64%.
For the next election, hammer and other voters remain the same, but the Water party has split off and immediately pulled a solid 25% of voters. Pepsi is still at 39%, still wins. Not ideal, but better than Hammer, right?
The following election sees even more Water voters, maybe higher turnout too. Hammer down to 30%, other voters 2%. Water and Pepsi are a close race, but turn out 33% to 35% in favour of Water.
That’s what I mean with compromise: strategically creating a statistical base on which change can be built without risking shooting your own foot.
Of course, the best option would be an actually fair voting system, like Ranked Choice (which is probably easiest to explain), but with how things are now, it’d take a lot of prep work and publicity work to get enough people on board so it doesn’t go sideways.
The article is saying that people in the rust belt are sick of both the warm Pepsi and the hammer, so now would be a great time to come in swinging with cool water because at this point people would actually vote them in over both.
Your entire explanation is predicated on the belief that the Warm Pepsi party doesn’t prefer watching everyone get their faces smashed in by hammers to working with the Cool Water party in any capacity.
Like I said, I get being fed up with compromise. I’m fed up too. But plurality voting sucks, so let’s do some math:
Hammer Party has 45% of the votes. Pepsi Party has 50%. 5% go to some other, minor parties.
Now suppose a Cool Water party appears, clearly better than Warm Pepsi. They start drawing voters, some from the Pepsi, some maybe from non-voters, but the Hammer Party adherents don’t relent. They make it to 10%, with the Pepsi Party now standing at, say, 45%. Hammer are down to 43% thanks to higher turnout. Other parties down to 2%.
Next election, more Pepsi compromise voters are encouraged to vote Water. Water is up to 25%! Hammer is at 38% now – we’re making progress! Except that the Pepsi party now has a maximum of 37%, if there are no non-voters. Hammer party now has the most votes. That’s called the spoiler effect.
Obviously, the Pepsi fraction might see that shift coming and try to avoid it. For that, they’d either have to pull some of the Hammer voters, or accede to the Water voters in hopes of retaining them. Do you think they’ll compromise with Water? And do you think the Water voters are willing to trust that compromise?
Unless you somehow manage to rapidly turn a party up to 50% or win a significant amount of voters from both camps, odds are you’re going to make things worse. Hopefully, they’ll get better after that, unless Hammer Party manages to rig the system in their favour or even get rid of it. Is that a risk worth taking?
For a different example, suppose Water and Pepsi teamed up. Let’s take the initial 5% other voters, manage to push Hammer down to 31% and put the Pepsi party at a solid 64%.
For the next election, hammer and other voters remain the same, but the Water party has split off and immediately pulled a solid 25% of voters. Pepsi is still at 39%, still wins. Not ideal, but better than Hammer, right?
The following election sees even more Water voters, maybe higher turnout too. Hammer down to 30%, other voters 2%. Water and Pepsi are a close race, but turn out 33% to 35% in favour of Water.
That’s what I mean with compromise: strategically creating a statistical base on which change can be built without risking shooting your own foot.
Of course, the best option would be an actually fair voting system, like Ranked Choice (which is probably easiest to explain), but with how things are now, it’d take a lot of prep work and publicity work to get enough people on board so it doesn’t go sideways.
The article is saying that people in the rust belt are sick of both the warm Pepsi and the hammer, so now would be a great time to come in swinging with cool water because at this point people would actually vote them in over both.
Your entire explanation is predicated on the belief that the Warm Pepsi party doesn’t prefer watching everyone get their faces smashed in by hammers to working with the Cool Water party in any capacity.
This is not the case.