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I think it’s generally agreed upon that Art. 42 (7) of the EU-Treaty is stronger than Art. 5.
EU: If a Member State is the victim of armed aggression on its territory, the other Member States shall have towards it an obligation of aid and assistance by all the means in their power, in accordance with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. This shall not prejudice the specific character of the security and defence policy of certain Member States.
“an obligation of aid and assistance by all means in their power”
vs
NATO: The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence recognised by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.
“as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force” means direct military support isn’t a guarantee.
I think it’s generally agreed upon that Art. 42 (7) of the EU-Treaty is stronger than Art. 5.
That’s absolutely not the consensus. This is what the EU themselves say about article 42:
Substantial uncertainty remains over the interpretation of Article 42(7). Following its first and only invocation in 2015, after the November terrorist attacks in Paris, debate intensified on how it works in practice, its scope, the definitions of ‘armed aggression’ and ‘territory’, and which forms of aggression it applies to (e.g. whether those include hybrid threats). Experts note that Article 42(7) ‘leaves more room for interpretation than one might expect from a clause in a legally binding text’. Many experts hoped that the Strategic Compass would deliver clarification, however that did not occur.
The problem is that through precedent we know that A5 invocations can (and almost certainly will) trigger military aid. With A42, you at best get “aid and assistance”, which the EU notes is super vague. The “by all means in their power” is also very vague legally speaking. Suppose Russia invades Estonia, and Latvia says “intervening militarily would invite a Russian invasion of Latvia, so intervening is outside of our power”. This consistent vagueness at every level of A42 makes it so it’s generally assumed that A42 could very well be weaker than A5, even if the wording appears stronger. It’s a political choice how to interpret A42, but with A5 the scopes are defined a bit more clearly, and there’s far less wiggle room due to the collective action, rather than the individual actions EU member states would take.
through precedent we know that A5 invocations can (and almost certainly will) trigger military aid.
I don’t see why this is ‘almost certain’. You rightfully point out that the EU clause leaves wiggle room, but I don’t see why you think that room is not there with NATO. I don’t know if the current US president cares much about any precedents. If he can wiggle he will wiggle. I don’t think Europe trusts US to honor A5 any more.
There is of course wiggle room in the NATO clause, but there’s less of it. Additionally, the fact that the collective decides if military action is needed then individual members don’t get an opt-out of that.
Of course, ultimately nothing is ironclad, but given the established precedent for A5 and the excessive amount of individual wiggle room in A42, as far as I know A5 is considered to be more likely to be successfully invoked than A42 is.
The EU defense clause gets triggered, which is basically a weak obligation to provide “assistance”. It’s not an automatic call to arms like NATO’s A5.
I think it’s generally agreed upon that Art. 42 (7) of the EU-Treaty is stronger than Art. 5.
EU: If a Member State is the victim of armed aggression on its territory, the other Member States shall have towards it an obligation of aid and assistance by all the means in their power, in accordance with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. This shall not prejudice the specific character of the security and defence policy of certain Member States.
“an obligation of aid and assistance by all means in their power”
vs
NATO: The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence recognised by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.
“as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force” means direct military support isn’t a guarantee.
That’s absolutely not the consensus. This is what the EU themselves say about article 42:
The problem is that through precedent we know that A5 invocations can (and almost certainly will) trigger military aid. With A42, you at best get “aid and assistance”, which the EU notes is super vague. The “by all means in their power” is also very vague legally speaking. Suppose Russia invades Estonia, and Latvia says “intervening militarily would invite a Russian invasion of Latvia, so intervening is outside of our power”. This consistent vagueness at every level of A42 makes it so it’s generally assumed that A42 could very well be weaker than A5, even if the wording appears stronger. It’s a political choice how to interpret A42, but with A5 the scopes are defined a bit more clearly, and there’s far less wiggle room due to the collective action, rather than the individual actions EU member states would take.
I don’t see why this is ‘almost certain’. You rightfully point out that the EU clause leaves wiggle room, but I don’t see why you think that room is not there with NATO. I don’t know if the current US president cares much about any precedents. If he can wiggle he will wiggle. I don’t think Europe trusts US to honor A5 any more.
There is of course wiggle room in the NATO clause, but there’s less of it. Additionally, the fact that the collective decides if military action is needed then individual members don’t get an opt-out of that.
Of course, ultimately nothing is ironclad, but given the established precedent for A5 and the excessive amount of individual wiggle room in A42, as far as I know A5 is considered to be more likely to be successfully invoked than A42 is.